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According to quantum theory, randomness is a fundamental property of the uni-
verse yet classical physics is mostly deterministic. In this article I show that it is
possible for deterministic systems to arise from random ones and discuss the impli-
cations of this for the concept of free will.
What does chance ever do for us?
—William Paley (1743-1805)
I. CLASSIFICATION OF PROCESS
What role does chance play in the evolution of the universe? Until the development of
quantum mechanics, the general consensus was that what we perceived as chance was really
just a manifestation of our lack of complete knowledge of a situation. In a letter to Max
Born in December of 1926, Einstein wrote of the new quantum mechanics, “The theory
says a lot, but does not really bring us any closer to the secret of the ‘old one.’ I, at any
rate, am convinced that He does not throw dice.” [6]. Yet all attempts to develop a deter-
ministic alternative to quantum mechanics have thus far failed. At the most fundamental
level, the universe appears to be decidedly random. How is it, then, that the ordered and
intentional world of our daily lives arise from this randomness? Intuitively, we tend to think
of randomness as being synonymous with unpredictability. But the very nature of the term
‘unpredictable’ implies agency since it implies that an agent is actively making a prediction.
I am not interested here in whether or not the universe requires an agent to make sense of
it. I’m interested in understanding if it is possible for intentionality to arise naturally from
something more fundamental and less ordered.
While we typically think of the universe as being a collection of ‘things’—particles, fields,
baseballs, elephants—it is the processes that these things participate in that make the uni-
verse interesting. A process need not require an active agent. A process is simply a change
in the state of something.1 This definition of process is similar to the concept of a test
from operational probabilistic theories (see [2] for a discussion of such theories). Similar
to such theories, then, we can define a deterministic process as being one for which the
outcome can be predicted with certainty. To put it another way, a deterministic process is
one for which there is only a single possible outcome. A random process must then be an
∗This article was submitted under the title ‘God’s Dice and Einstein’s Solids’ to the Spring 2017 FQXi
essay contest.
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1It would seem necessary to define ‘state’ here, but given the limitations on length we will leave that for
another essay.
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2unpredictable change. That is, a process for which there is more than one possible outcome
is said to be random if all possible outcomes are equally likely to occur. It’s important to
note that there is a difference between the likelihood of making an accurate prediction of the
outcome of a process and one’s confidence in that prediction. Confidence can be quantified
as a number between 0 (no confidence) and 1 (perfect confidence). Likelihood is just the
probability that a given outcome will occur for a given process. The outcomes of random
processes are all equally likely to occur and, in such cases, one’s confidence in accurately
predicting the correct outcome should be zero.
It is worth noting here the difference between determinism and causality. The concepts are
often incorrectly confused. Indeed, D’Ariano, Manessi, and Perinotti have argued that this
confusion has led to misinterpretations of the nature of EPR correlations [4]. Determinism
and randomness represent the extremes of predictability. A fully causal theory can have both.
To put it another way, in a fully causal theory a random process must still have a cause. Or,
as D’Ariano, Manessi, and Perinotti have shown, it is possible to have deterministic processes
without causality. The difference is that determinism is related to the outcomes of a given
process whereas causality is related to the actual occurrence of that process regardless of
whether it is deterministic or random.
Of course, many real processes are neither random nor deterministic. There may be more
than one possible outcome for a process, but those outcomes may not be equally likely to
occur. What do we call such processes? For a two-outcome process whose outcomes have a
51% and 49% likelihood of occurrence respectively, one might be tempted to refer to it as
‘nearly random.’ On the other hand, if those same likelihoods were 99% and 1% respectively,
one might be tempted to say the process was ‘nearly deterministic.’ But what if they were
80% and 20% or 60% and 40%? At what point do we stop referring to a process as ‘nearly
deterministic’ or ‘nearly random’? We need less arbitrary language. One suggestion would
be to refer to such in between cases as ‘probabilistic.’ But this is misleading since we can
still assign probabilities to the outcomes of random and deterministic processes; they are no
less probabilistic than any other process.
A solution presents itself if we consider the aggregate, long-term behavior of such pro-
cesses. As an example, consider that casinos set the odds on games of craps—a game that
is neither random nor deterministic—under the assumption that they will make money on
these games in the long run and (crucially) that the amount of money they will make is
reliably predictable within some acceptable range of error. So the process of rolling a pair
of dice (which is all that craps is) is at least partially deterministic to a casino. But now
consider a game with two outcomes, A and B, whose respective probabilities of occurring are
50.5% and 49.5%. Could a casino set up a system by which they could, within some range
of error, make a long-term profit on this game, even if that profit is very small? Suppose it
costs $100 to play this game and that a player receives $102 if outcome B occurs but nothing
if outcome A occurs. Suppose also that, on average, the casino expects 10,000 people to
play this game each year. That means that, on average, they will pay out $504,900 a year
in winnings but keep $505,000 a year in fees leaving them with $100 in profit (on average).
Though this is ridiculously low, the crucial point is that it is not zero. As low as it is, the
casinos can still budget for it and, in the long run, can expect to make a profit on it. The
fact is that something like this can be done for any process that is not random. Non-random
processes are always predictable in the aggregate, though the sample size may need to be ex-
ceedingly large. Since deterministic processes are perfectly predictable for every occurrence,
it makes sense to refer to processes that are predictable only in the aggregate as partially
3deterministic since they do contain an certain deterministic element to them.
II. A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
The aforementioned game of craps simply involves betting on the outcome of a roll of a
pair of dice. The game is as old as dice themselves and serves as a useful example of how some
level of partial determinism can arise from randomness. It also provides a straightforward
method for introducing a few additional terms. Those wishing to delve more deeply into
this subject are encouraged to dive into Refs. [1, 9, 10].
Consider a fair, six-sided die. As a fair die, it is assumed that upon rolling this die, all of
the six outcomes are equally likely. In fact casinos paint the dots on their dice, rather than
use the usual divots because the divots are not equally distributed and thus throw off the
center-of-mass which changes the long-term probabilities.2 While real dice are never truly
random, a so-called ‘fair die’ is considered to be a theoretical ideal and is thus random.
Now consider a roll of two fair dice as in a game of craps. Since they are both fair
dice, each outcome on each individual die is equally likely. We are also assuming that
we can easily distinguish the dice from one another e.g. perhaps one is blue and one is
red. Considered together, then, there are thirty-six possible outcomes—configurations—to
a single, simultaneous roll of both. Since we can distinguish between the two dice, if the
roll produces a four on the blue die and a three on the red die, this is an entirely different
outcome from a three on the blue die and a four on the red one. Each of these configurations
is referred to as a microstate.
But in craps, as in other games that use a pair of dice, we are often interested in the sum
of the numbers on the faces. Thus we typically consider the roll of a pair of dice as giving
us a number between two and twelve. We call this number the macrostate. If we look at
each of the thirty-six microstates, we’ll see that they can be grouped according to which
macrostate they produce. The number of microstates that will produce a given macrostate
is known as the multiplicity and is given the symbol Ω. But note that the multiplicities of
the macrostates for the roll of a pair of fair dice are not all equal. There are, for instance,
six different combinations that can produce a roll of seven (I gave two of these six above).
On the other hand, there is one and only one way to roll a two or a twelve.
The probability of a given roll (i.e. macrostate) is given by the multiplicity of that roll
divided by the total multiplicity. So, for example, the probability of rolling a seven is six
divided by thirty-six or one-sixth. Conversely, the probability of rolling a two or a twelve
is one-thirty-sixth. Table I lists the microstates for each macrostate of the pair of dice,
giving the multiplicity and probability of each. Though we think of this as a single roll of
a pair dice, it is really two simultaneous rolls of individual dice. Each of these individual
rolls is a random process yet when they are considered together as a single roll that single
roll of the pair is partially deterministic. As should be clear from Table I this behavior is
not physical in the sense that the probabilities of the individual macrostates are due to the
combinatorics of the problem or what what might call ‘mindless’ mathematics. So a pithy
counter to Einstein’s objection might be that a dice-throwing God still produces a partially
predictable result.
There is one objection to this example that is worth considering. The numbers on the
2They also routinely replace their dice since the sides of dice can wear unevenly. See Ref. [7].
4Macrostate Microstates Ω Probability
2 1 1/36
3 , 2 2/36=1/18
4 , , 3 3/36=1/12
5 , , , 4 4/36=1/9
6 , , , , 5 5/36
7 , , , , , 6 6/36=1/6
8 , , , , 5 5/36
9 , , , 4 4/36=1/9
10 , , 3 3/36=1/12
11 , 2 2/36=1/18
12 1 1/36
Total: 36 1
TABLE I: This table lists the microstates for each macrostate for a roll of a pair of six-sided dice.
The multiplicity, Ω, is the total number of microstates.
dice are entirely arbitrary. That is, we could have instead painted six different animals on
the faces of each die. In this case we might find it hard-pressed to identify any distinctive
macrostates other than pairs and we could eliminate the pairs by painting different animals
on each die. Thus it seems as if the macrostates used in typical die rolls are entirely arbitrary
in the sense that their relative import is based on a meaning that we assign to them. The
labelling of the sides of the dice is not a fundamental property of the dice themselves. We
can get around this problem and improve on our odds by perhaps ironically considering a
model proposed by Einstein nineteen years before his comment to Born.
III. EINSTEIN SOLIDS
In 1907 Einstein proposed a model of solids as sets of quantum oscillators. That is, each
atom in such a solid is modeled in such a way that it is allowed to oscillate in any one of
three independent directions. Thus a solid having N oscillators would consist of N/3 atoms.
Crucially, since the oscillators are quantum, they can only hold discrete amounts of energy.
So, for instance, suppose that we have an overly simplified Einstein solid containing just a
single atom and thus three oscillators. If we supply that solid with a single discrete unit of
energy, that energy unit could be absorbed by any one of the three oscillators, but cannot
be further subdivided and shared among them. It is assumed that the process of absorption
is random. In other words, for a macrostate consisting of a single unit of energy, there
are three equally likely microstates, i.e. Ω = 3. In general, for an Einstein solid with N
oscillators and q units of energy, the multiplicity is
Ω(N, q) =
(
q + N − 1
q
)
=
(q + N − 1)!
q!(N − 1)! . (1)
Now consider two Einstein solids that are weakly thermally coupled and approximately
isolated from the rest of the universe. By weakly thermally coupled, I mean that the exchange
of thermal energy between them is much slower than the exchange of thermal energy among
5the atoms within each solid. This means that over sufficiently short time scales the energies
of the individual solids remain essentially fixed. Thus we can refer to the macrostate of
the isolated two-solid system as being specified by the individual fixed values of internal
energy. (For a further discussion, see Ref. [10].) Let’s begin by considering a simple (albeit
unrealistic) system. Suppose each of our two solids has three oscillators, i.e. NA = NB = 3,
and the system has a total of six units of energy that can be divvied up between the
oscillators. Suppose that we put all six of these units of energy into solid B. That means
that there is only one possible configuration for the oscillators in solid A—they all contain
zero energy. Conversely, there are twenty-eight configurations for the oscillators in solid B
according to (1). The total number of configurations for the system as a whole is just the
product of the two and thus is also twenty-eight.
Suppose that we instead put a single unit of energy into solid A with the rest going to
solid B. In this case, there are three possible configurations for solid A since the single unit
of energy we’ve supplied to it could be in any one of the three oscillators. The five remaining
units of energy can be distributed in any one of twenty-one ways within solid B. But now
the total number of configurations for the system is 3 · 21 = 63. Table II summarizes the
energy distribution and corresponding multiplicity for this simple system and Fig. I shows
a smoothed plot of the total multiplicity, Ωtot as a function of the energy qA contained in
solid A.
qA ΩA qB ΩB Ωtot = ΩAΩB
0 1 6 28 28
1 3 5 21 63
2 6 4 15 90
3 10 3 10 100
4 15 2 6 90
5 21 1 3 63
6 28 0 1 28
TABLE II: This table shows the distribution of
six units of energy among two Einstein solids,
each with three oscillators.
Ωtot
qA
NA = NB = 3
q = 6
FIG. 1: This shows a smoothed plot of Ωtot as a
function of qA for the data from Table I.
This tells us that the states for which the energy is more evenly balanced between the two
solids are more likely to occur because there are more possible ways to distribute the energy
in such cases. This is analogous to the example given in the previous section involving a pair
of fair dice. There is no intentionality on the part of the system. In addition, the system
is considered to be isolated from the rest of the universe and thus there is no environment
driving these results. They are simply due to combinatorics. Each individual microstate of
the combined system is assumed to be equally probable and thus the process of reaching
one of these microstates from any other is completely random. It just happens that more of
those microstates correspond to configurations in which the energy is more evenly divided
between the two solids. Thus the system can undergo random fluctuations about the mean
and still be more likely to be found in a microstate in which the energy is roughly equally
divided between the two solids.
6Ωtot
qA
N, q ≈ a few hundred Ωtot
qA
N, q ≈ a few thousand
(a) (b)
FIG. 2: (a) This shows a plot of Ωtot as a function of qA for a pair of Einstein solids when N, q ≈
a few hundred. (b) This is the resultant plot for the solids when N, q ≈ a few thousand.
But consider now what happens when we begin to scale the system up to more realistic
sizes. Fig. 2a shows a plot of the total multiplicity of the system as a function of the energy
in solid A when the total number of oscillators and the total number of energy units is a
few hundred. Fig. 2b shows a plot of the same function when the number of oscillators
and energy units is a few thousand. The larger our Einstein solids become, the narrower
the peak of the multiplicity function. For realistic Einstein solids, the peak is so narrow
that only a tiny fraction of microstates have a reasonable probability of occurring. That is,
random fluctuations away from equilibrium are entirely unmeasurable.
It is important to keep in mind that all we have done in Fig. 2 is to scale up the Einstein
solids. Each individual microstate remains equally probable and thus the underlying process
of moving from one microstate to another is entirely random. Yet, as the system grows larger
and larger, it is increasingly likely to be found in only a very small number of microstates.
This means that we can make highly accurate predictions of which microstates will occur
given some initial input data. This is a dramatically scaled up analogy to a game of craps.
Though the fluctuations taking the system from one microstate to another are entirely
random, the macrostate is very nearly deterministic. And though I have used a decidedly
physical example, the result is simply a consequence of the combinatorial behavior of very
large numbers. Thus we have a situation in which a nearly deterministic process can arise
from random processes due solely to something that is almost entirely mathematical. In
addition, unlike the situation with the dice, we are not arbitrarily assigning meaning to the
microstates and macrostates.
An obvious question is whether or not it is possible to achieve perfect determinism with
a pair of Einstein solids. Certainly in the limit that N, q → ∞ the narrowness of the mul-
tiplicity peak in our example becomes asymptotically thin. The limit in which a system
becomes large enough that random fluctuations away from equilibrium become unmeasur-
able is known as the thermodynamic limit. In other words, at some point our partially
deterministic system becomes indistinguishable from a fully deterministic one. Where that
transition occurs may depend on a host of factors, but the reason it is referred to as the
thermodynamic limit is precisely because it is where conventional thermodynamic meth-
ods of analysis—which are deterministic!—become the most useful way to understand the
behavior of a pair of solids that are in thermal contact with one another.
Of course, this is just a single example from one area of physics but it serves to show
7that near-perfectly deterministic macroscopic processes can arise from a very large number
of random microscopic processes due to the ‘mindless’ behavior of mathematics.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FREE WILL
Let us consider a toy universe in which all microscopic processes are random and thus
equally probable. The only physical constraints that we will place on this toy universe are
to limit the outcomes of each microscopic process to being finite in number and to require
that these outcomes be distinguishable from one another. Macroscopic processes in such
a toy universe would have varying levels of determinism based on the combinatorics and
the nature of the processes themselves. For example, the microstates and macrostates of a
pair of six-sided dice are different from the microstates and macrostates of one six-sided die
and one eight-sided die. Thus the nature of the dice dictate which processes are allowed in
each case (e.g. a roll of fourteen is not possible with a pair of six-sided dice). For our toy
universe, we can think of any constraints as being dictated by the initial physical conditions
of the universe itself.
It is worth asking, then, what it would mean for a hypothetical ‘being’ in such a universe
to have free will. Free will is generally viewed as one’s ability to freely choose between
different courses of action. This requires, however, that when presented with a choice, an
agent can reliably predict the outcome of some process. If I am, for instance, faced with the
choice of carrots or broccoli as a vegetable side for my dinner, the essence of free will is that,
free of unpredictable external factors, if I choose to have carrots I can have confidence that I
will actually have carrots with my dinner, i.e. the carrots won’t randomly and inexplicably
turn into a potato the moment they touch my plate. The crucial but subtle difference here is
that my choice in this example is between two different processes—the process of physically
taking carrots from my refrigerator or the process of physically taking broccoli from my
refrigerator—rather than two different outcomes of a single process. So once I have chosen
to carry out one or the other of these processes, I can have confidence that the multiplicity
of one outcome of my chosen process is so much greater than the multiplicity of any other
outcome that my desired result will actually occur, i.e. the probability of the most likely
macrostate not occurring is utterly unmeasurable.
Of course, any beings in our hypothetical toy universe are unequivocally part of that
universe and thus an amalgam of random processes themselves. If the deterministic macro-
scopic processes arise from microscopic random ones solely due to the combinatorics of a
large number of such microscopic processes, then it is worth asking if free will really does
exist. This is certainly a fair question, but misses the broader point. Regardless of what
happens at the most fundamental level, the concept of free will is meant to be applied to
sentient beings (which are inherently not fundamental) making conscious choices about the
macrostates of large-scale systems. As sentient beings we expect that free will entails our
ability to freely make a choice with the confidence that a specific outcome of our chosen
process really does occur with a high degree of probability. For that to happen certain
processes must be at least partially deterministic if not fully so.
This brings up an important distinction. There are really different levels of processes. We
can refer to a process associated with a macrostate as a macroprocess. The constituent pro-
cesses of a macroprocess would then be microprocesses. The macroprocess of simultaneously
rolling a single pair of dice is composed of two microprocesses—the independent rolls of two
individual dice. So the terminology refers to the level of the system and not necessarily
8the size of the system or its constituents. The act of me pulling carrots out of a bin in my
refrigerator is a macroprocess that actually consists of trillions of microprocesses involving
the neurons in my brain, the electrical signals in my neurological system, the mechanical
motion of the refrigerator parts, etc. These in turn are all made up of further constituent
processes all the way down to the processes involving the fundamental particles and fields
that constitute the material foundation of the entire system.
Free will thus generally involve choices about macroprocesses with varying degrees of
confidence. I may be highly confident that the carrots in my refrigerator won’t spontaneously
turn into potatoes, but I’m a tad less confident that inserting the key into the ignition of my
car will turn the car on. Certainly I expect it to turn on most of the time, but it is entirely
plausible that something could go wrong and it won’t turn on. I’m even less confident when
I approach an unfamiliar intersection and don’t know which way to go. Depending on the
situation, my choice could essentially be entirely random. The key point here is that if all
macroprocesses were entirely random, we wouldn’t even have the illusion of free will because
our choices would be meaningless since they would be based entirely on guesses. So free
will requires that most macroprocesses be at least partially deterministic. But, crucially,
microprocesses can still be random since their combinatorial behavior can lead to partially
deterministic macroprocesses like the rolling of dice or the equilibrium state of two solids in
thermal contact.
V. BOUNDARY CONDITIONS
There’s one final objection to this line of argument that should be addressed. It’s clear
that the emergence of determinism and free will in this model is not solely due to the
combinatorics alone. After all, the mathematics refers to something physical. As I said
before, the behavior of a six-sided die is different from the behavior of an eight-sided die.
So at the most fundamental level there has to be something non-mathematical in order to
distinguish, for example, a quark from a lepton or even the number one from the number two.
But it is worth asking if the combinatorics itself can produce additional boundary conditions
on the system that then further constrain its evolution. In other words, is it possible for a
system’s own internal combinatorics to change the probabilities of future macrostates?
In the simple example using dice, no matter how many times we roll them, the com-
binatorics alone will not change the probabilities of the macrostates. Certainly the dice
could wear down unevenly over time, but this is an external effect. But consider a pair of
Einstein solids in thermal contact as I described in the previous section. A microprocess
for such a system is the shifting of an energy unit from one oscillator to another. This
microprocess is fundamentally random. If we introduce a large number of energy units to
such a system and assume it has a large number of oscillators, regardless of how those en-
ergy units are initially distributed, over time the system will find itself limited to just a
few possible microstates. Crucially, these random microprocesses don’t suddenly cease to
occur when the system reaches equilibrium. Energy continues to be passed around while
the underlying microprocesses remain random, yet fluctuations away from equilibrium even-
tually become unmeasurable. This is simply because a few microstates near equilibrium
have an enormously higher probability of occurring than all the other microstates. In this
sense, the macrostate corresponding to equilibrium has imposed a boundary condition on
future macroprocesses purely through combinatorics. So while the evolution toward equi-
librium has no effect on the underlying microprocesses which are presumably fixed by the
9inescapable laws of physics, it does have an effect on the future evolution of the aggregate
macroprocesses for entirely combinatorial reasons.
So while free will does not allow us to alter the laws of physics, it does act as an introduced
boundary condition that can allow for a certain amount of environmental forcing on the
macro-level and it seems that it is at least possible for that to happen for purely combinatorial
reasons.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is little in this article that is actually speculative. Admittedly I am considering
highly simplified systems here, but they at least demonstrate that it is possible for something
ordered and intentional to arise from the aggregate behavior of a collection of random
processes with no external forcing, i.e. due solely to combinatorics. The behavior of such
systems also suggests that it is entirely possible for free will to emerge from something far
less ordered. In fact both Eddington and Compton argued that the randomness of quantum
mechanics was a necessary condition for free will [3, 5]. On the other hand, Lloyd has argued
that even deterministic systems can’t predict the results of their decision-making process
ahead of time [8]. Is free will just an illusion? Does it require randomness or does it require
determinism? The answers to these questions undoubtedly lie in a deeper understanding of
the transition from quantum systems to classical ones. In this essay I have shown that the
seeds of such an understanding might be found in simple combinatorics. The mindless laws
of mathematics might just be what allows the universe to evolve intentionality. At the very
least, it is worth a deeper look.
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